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THE GENEALOGY OF THE OUTSIDER'S ROLE IN




The primary issue to be analyzed in this article is the effect
which Public Law 90-439,1 providing for full disclosure of equity
ownership of securities under the Securities Act of 1934, will have
on the disclosure duty of an outsider making a tender offer for
control of a corporation. Resolution of this issue inevitably leads to
the battle currently being fought among those learned in the area
over the wisdom or lack thereof of placing any disclosure duty
upon the outsider.2
II
Prior to enactment of Public Law 90-439, the status of an out-
sider's duty to disclose in connection with attempted corporate ac-
quisition rested on a single decision, Mills v. Sarjem Corp.3 There,
Chief Judge Forman of the Federal District Court for the District
of New Jersey cleared the field of what were thought to be the
troublesome problems. In that case, the acquirer's purpose was to
buy eighty percent of the outstanding stock of a corporation and
then sell the assets of the corporation to a public commission to be
established for that purpose. The acquirer accomplished this at a
substantial profit. Judge Forman interred the suggestion of a dis-
closure duty on the part of the outsider by holding that the acquisi-
tion of a controlling percentage of a corporation's securities was not
sufficient to impose on the insurgent group disclosure obligations
similar to those imposed on the "insider." In addition, Forman noted
that an insurgent group acquiring the control of a corporation owes
no duty to disclose material information concerning the issuer's
affairs prior to becoming a controlling shareholder.
* A.B., cum laude, Creighton University, 1967; J.D., University of Ne-
braska, 1970. Member, Nebraska Bar Association. Law Clerk, Judge
John W. Delehant, United States District Court, District of Nebraska.
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), -(e), 78n(d), -(e), -(f) (Supp. 1970). The statute
is set out in the Appendix.
2 See, e.g., Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chair-
man Cohen, 1967 Duxn L.J. 231; Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited,
79 HAnv. L. REv. 1340, 1399-1400 (1966). The conflicting positions of
these authors will be dealt with at greater length in the course of
this article.
3 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
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To Forman it was clear that many forms of conduct are permis-
sible in a business setting for those acting at arm's length. He
demonstrated by prior case law that only those traditionally in the
locus standi of a fiduciary had a duty to separate their interests
from those of their fellows, to conduct themselves at a level above
that trodden by the crowd, so as not to abuse the special opportuni-
ties growing out of their positions of trust.
As to the plaintiff's argument that defendants became such fidu-
ciaries at the time of payment of an escrow deposit whereby
Sarjem's nominees occupied positions as directors of the acquired
corporation, Forman observed:
[Defendants] cannot be said at that time, by reason of their newly
acquired position, to have come into any inside information un-
known to the sellers of their stock .... They of course knew then,
as they had known long before, that they intended to dispose of
the Talcony-Palmyra stock at a profit. No information came to
them upon their achievement of control over the stock which they
had purchased, or even to those from whom they were subsequently
to purchase.... In short, the alleged scheme to capitalize upon the
ownership of the stock of Talcony-Palmyra Bridge Company was
conceived and prosecuted strictly by "outsiders" upon whom there
was no duty of disclosure.4
With regard to this portion of the holding, Professor Painter
points out that the court was on "sound footing." As Painter notes:
"[T]he true 'outsider' insurgent under the law prior to enactment
of the Williams' Bill had no duty other than to refrain from posi-
tive misstatements of fact or possibly, 'half-truths' concerning the
issuer."5 With this case as their lodestar, and with quiet pride, the
courts have retired from the field.
In this vein, Bromberg asserts that an outsider could not be ex-
pected to provide internal information about the issuer, since that
is the issuer's duty under the proxy rules:
He can, however, tell what he knows about the material facts
whether insiders have been approached first and whether they have
agreed to accept the offer or a better one .... [This duty is con-
sistent with the SEC's view that] the outsider has the same status
and duty as an insider if he has obtained inside information.
4 Id. at 765.
5 Statement of William H. Painter, Professor of Law, University of
Mfissouri at Kansas City. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Comm. on
Banking and Currency on Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Owner-
ship, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 144 (1967).
6 A. BROMBERG, SEcURITiEs LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 at 119-20
(1967). Professor Brudney notes: "If outsiders in a takeover attempt
make false statements or half-truths, or manipulate the market price
of securities in order to make a profit, remedies under Rule 10b-5 and
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But why should the acquiring outsider disclose his reasons for
the potential control of a corporation's securities? This is perhaps
the thorniest issue which confronts one in this area. Bromberg sug-
gests a solution based on the concreteness of the rewards visualized
by the acquirer. As with any test which rests upon the subjective
factors of intent, the waters are necessarily murky, for motivation
and intent are difficult to assess.
Bromberg's test, in essence, states that if the offeror perceives
no readily ascertainable and reasonably certain values, the interest,
under a balancing test of sorts, lies in favor of nondisclosure; if
the values which the offeror perceives do in fact materialize, the
offeror will not be deprived of the concomitant rewards. On the
other hand, if the values are existing ones, the interest lies in favor
of disclosure.7 Such a test revolves around the underlying considera-
tion that a person should not be penalized for making a shrewd
business judgment. This type of rationale would explain the result
reached in the Sarjem case. There Chief Judge Forman proclaimed
that the scheme of the defendants was "highly speculative and
uncertain, both as to ultimate materiality and its legality."8
In a seminal article in this area, Milton H. Cohen rejected such
distinctions, casting his lot for complete disclosure.9 Cohen argued
that where a person engages in a program to gain control of a cor-
poration and change that corporation's management and policies,
he is the only source of material information. Such a person, ob-
served Cohen, although technically an outsider, in fact stands in
the position of an insider, and possesses knowledge and information
of great import to the investor.
Yet existing law does not specify any affirmative disclosure re-
quirements; even Rule lOb-5 probably imposes no affirmative dis-
closure obligation in these circumstances, as distinguished from
the negative obligation to avoid fraud or misrepresentation in what-
ever communications are used.' 0
Thus, with a paucity of case law in this area and many conflicting
issues necessary of resolution, a view of the competing business con-
siderations involved in the tender offer, as it relates to whether a
disclosure obligation should be placed on the outsider, is in order.
otherwise appear available." Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender
Solicitations, 21 RuT. L. REV. 609, 634 (1967) (footnotes omitted). In
this regard, see Cooper v. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972(S.D.N.Y. 1964) and Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
7 A. BRO mERG, supra note 6, at 121.
8 133 F. Supp. at 767.
9 Cohen, supra note 2. Subsequently, Cohen has questioned disclosure
in certain areas.
10 Id. at 1399.
68 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 50, NO. 1 (1971)
I
The leitmotif of the Securities Act of 1934 is disclosure. How-
ever, the question arises whether this policy in any way conflicts
with the basic business considerations of the tender offer. Assuming
that the tender offer possesses legitimate merit, would the benefits
that might be derived from disclosure remove the blessing with
the bane?
Cohen's remarks may be used to set the stage for the problem
at hand:
There is . . . one area, now largely neglected, where an outsider
may well be the only possible source of material information:
where he is embarking on a purchase program with the intent or
the potential of obtaining control, changing management, adopting
new policies, moving on in new directions .... [In this instance]
the outsider is actually an insider, and his inside information may
be of great importance to investors."'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently agreed that the
outsider has had no such disclosure duty. In Iroquois Industries,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.12 a tender offeror brought suit against
a corporation under section 10b of the Securities Act of 1934, alleg-
ing false and misleading information to that corporation's own
stockholders, reports of sham merger negotiations, and activities of
like kind in an effort to defeat the tender offer. After holding that
the courts could not expand the coverage of section 10b beyond that
intended by Congress, Judge Wyatt noted:
That Congress enacted the new Section 14(C) to prohibit fraud
by "any person" in respect to tender offers is at least an indication
that in tender offer contests such as that at bar there was no stand-
ing to sue under Rule lOb-5 by either the tender offeror or by the
target corporation.' 3
With this gap in existing law in view, Senator Harrison Williams
(Dem. N.J.) introduced a bill in 1965 which provided that any per-
son or related group of persons proposing to acquire more than
five percent of a class of equity securities registered under the 1934
Act would have a duty to file a statement in advance, indicating
identity, background, source of funds, and purpose of the intended
acquisition.14
That version of the disclosure provisions died in the eighty-
ninth Congress. Its successor, Public Law 90-439, introduced by
Senators Williams and Kuchel (Rep. Cal.), embodies alterations
and modifications which the SEC has consistently advocated. The
11 Id.
12 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969).
13 Id. at 969.
14 S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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present law. offers greater protection to offerees than the 1965 ver-
sion. However, whereas the prior bill was, in the words of Pro-
fessor Brudney, "more frankly designed to discourage take-over
bids,"'15 the successor bill, according to Senator Williams, reflected
a conscious attempt to "balance the legitimate interests of a cor-
poration, management and shareholders without unduly impeding
cash takeover bids."'16
The present provision amends section thirteen of the 1934 Act
by providing that a person, after acquiring the beneficial owner-
ship of more than ten percent of the equity securities of a given
class, shall within ten days send to the issuer and each exchange
where the security is traded, as well as file with the SEC, a state-
ment containing identity of purchasers, source of funds, ultimate
purpose of the acquirer (such as whether liquidation, merger or
other change in corporate structure is planned), and similar infor-
mation.17 The act exempts a person from filing if, within the pre-
ceding twelve months, he acquired less than two percent of the
securities of that class.18
Another provision, amending section fourteen of the 1934 Act,
is framed in language similar to that of Rule 10b-5 and gives broad
rule-making authority to the SEC regarding sending of the filed
information with each offer to purchase 9 If the consideration to
be paid for shares is varied, the offeror is liable to all other share-
holders for the amount of any increased consideration.20
15 Brudney, supra note 8, at 610 n. 2.
16 133 Conu. REc. 444 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1967).
17 Section (2) (d) (1). See Appendix.
.8 Section 2 (d) (5) (B).
19 Section 3 (d).
20 Section 3(d) (7). In this regard, consider a recent SEC release:
"[Text] Where securities are purchased for a consideration greater
than that of the tender offer price, this operates to the disadvantage
of the security holders who have already deposited their securities
and who are unable to withdraw them in order to obtain the advantage
of possible resulting higher market prices. Additionally, irrespective
of the price at which such purchases are made, they are often fraudu-
lent or manipulative in nature, and they can deceive the investing
public as to the true state of affairs.... Accordingly, by prohibiting
a person who makes a cash tender offer or exchange offer from pur-
chasing equity securities of the same class during the tender offer
period otherwise than pursuant to the offer itself, the rule accom-
plishes the objective of safeguarding the interests of the persons
who have tendered their securities in response to a cash tender offer
or exchange offer; moreover, once the offer has been made, [Rule
106-13] removes any incentive on the part of holders of substantial
blocks of securities to demand from the person making a tender offer
or exchange offer a consideration greater than or different from that
currently offered to public investors. [End Text]
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Within one month after the enactment of the Williams Bill,
temporary rules were adopted by the SEC to give the Act imme-
diate impact. Under Rule 13d-1 a schedule 13D must be filed by
any person who becomes a ten percent stockholder.21 This schedule
must contain source of funds, names of parties, and purpose of the
purchase. It has been suggested that in determining when a person
becomes a "beneficial owner" of ten percent of the equity securities
of a company, the "law and lore" of section sixteen of the 1934 Act
and Rule 13d-3, which restates Rule 16a-2(b), will prove of aid.22
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal contained an example
of the conduct the Act seeks to attack:
A group of unidentified investors offered to buy 500,000 shares of
Studebaker Corp. common stock at $30 a share. . . . [Lehman
Brothers, one of two investment banking houses representing the
bidders,) declined to identify the prospective purchasers .... The
500,000 shares constitute about 18% of Studebaker's outstanding
stock.2 3
"The rule does not prohibit a person who, at the commence-
ment of the offer, owns securities convertible into or exchangeable
for securities of the class which are the subject of the offer from
converting or exchanging such holdings into such securities.
"[Text] The rule deals with purchases or arrangements to purchase,
directly or indirectly, which are made from the time of public an-
nouncement or initiation of the tender offer or exchange offer, until
the person making the offer is required either to accept or reject the
tendered securities. As used in the rule an offer could be publicly
announced or otherwise made known to the holders of the target
security through a published advertisement, a news release, or other
communication by or for the person making the offer to holders of
the security being sought for cash tender or exchange. Moreover, any
understanding or arrangement during the tender offer period, whether
or not the terms and conditions thereof have been agreed upon, to
make or negotiate such a purchase after the expiration of that period
would be prohibited by the rule. Purchases made prior to the incep-
tion of that period are not specifically prohibited under the rule....
Of course, the general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions
could apply to such pre-tender purchases. The prohibition of Rule
lOb-13 applies to exchange offers when publicly announced even
though they cannot be made until the happening of a future event.
[End Text]
"The Commission may, unconditionally or on terms and conditions,
exempt any transaction from the operation of the rule, if the Com-
mission finds that the exemption would not result in manipulation
or deception within the purpose of the rule, but this exemptive pro-
vision will be narrowly construed and an exemption granted only in
cases involving very special circumstances." SEC Release No. 8712
(Oct. 8, 1969). Cited in 38 U.S.L.W. 2221 (Oct. 14, 1969).
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1970).
22 Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection with Cash Takeover Bids:
The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAw. 19, 20 (1968).
23 Wall Street Journal, Feb. 8, 1966, at 1, col. 2.
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Another article, after noting that companies and individuals seek-
ing acquisitions by tender offer usually cite their reason as being
"for investment purposes only," continues that another problem is
that the tender-maker may make subsequent offers at a higher price
if its initial offer for shares does not prove successful.24
The Act, whose purpose, according to its title, is "Full Disclo-
sure of Corporate Equity Ownership of Securities," met with wide-
scale support while it was before the Congress. Former SEC Chair-
man Manuel Cohen observed that since such acquisitions of voting
securities were merely alternatives to proxy solicitations as methods
of gaining corporate control, the protection provided in the bill
was a necessity. Alteration of control, noted Cohen, led to different
operating results and hence different investment results. He stressed
that the provisions of the bill for contested tenders were analogous
to the present proxy solicitation rules.25
24 New York Times, April 2, 1967. Quoted in Hearings on S. 510, supra
note 5, at 251-57. The Times cites by way of exemplification two sepa-
rate incidents. In the first, Fifth Avenue Coach Lines made an offer to
buy 260,000 shares of Austin Nichals and Company, a liquor distributor,
at $20 per share. At the time, the Austin stock was selling at $14 a
share. Thwarted in its effort to obtain all the shares it desired, Fifth
Avenue made a second offer for $27.50 per share, at a time when the
shares were selling at a market price of $22.
In the second case, Paul Revere Corporation, a holding company,
completed a tender of $132 million for 4 million shares at $33 per
share. Prior to the offer, Avco shares were selling for $26. The Times
article notes that in the aftermath of the Revere offer the price per
share rose to a level equal to that of the offer price by Revere, de-
clined slightly when Revere accepted 4 million of the 9 million shares
tendered, and then mounted steadily to $44 a share, $11 above the
tender price, after news of a proposed merger with Revere.
Many additional examples are collected and set forth in Swanson,
S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St.
George from the Dragon, 5 HARv. J. LEGIs. 431, 448-54 (1968). Swan-
son treats at great length the recent tender offer for the shares of
Columbia Pictures Corporation.
It may be of interest to note here that under the temporary rules
adopted by the SEC to give the Act immediate effect, a discernible
"deadening effect" on the style of tender offer advertisements has
occurred. This is so since all soliciting material must contain a sum-
mary of the information required by schedule 13D under the rules.
Examples of this "deadening effect" are: The Wall Street Journal, Aug.
19, 1968, at 15 (offer of International Control Corp. for Electronic
Specialty Co.); The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 6, 1968, at 17 (offer
of Allegheny Corp. for Jones Motor Co., Inc.); The Wall Street Jour-
nal, March 31, 1970, at 23 (offer of International Utilities Corp. for
Pacific International Express Co.).
For an interesting article on the requirements of the new rules see
Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection with Cash Takeover Bids:
The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAwYER 19 (1968).
25 Statement of Manuel F. Cohen, supra note 5, at 33-35.
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Senator Kuchel likened tender offers to the machinations of
the "Six Per Cent Club" of 1792, of whom Jefferson had declared:
"[T]he credit and fate of the nation seem to hang on the desperate
throws and plunges of gambling scoundrels." Kuchel pointed out
that he supported Senate 510 because:
Today, there are those individuals in our financial community who
seek to reduce our proudest businesses into nothing but corporate
shells. They seize control of the corporation with unknown sources,
sell or trade away the best assets, and later split up the remains
among themselves. The tragedy of such collusion is that the cor-
poration can be financially raped without the management or share-
holders having any knowledge of the acquisitions .... 26
Professor Painter had encomiums for the broad language of the
bill, which left to the SEC, "who is best equipped to examine the
ramifications of the problem," the opportunity for further study and
rule making, and afforded a deterrent effect to corporate takeovers
by "undesirable elements" through "sheer uncertainty of its appli-
cation.12
7
On the other hand, some authorities testifying at the hearings
would have no truck with mere analysis of the provisions of the
bill aloof from salutary business considerations in favor of tender
offers. Professor Samuel L. Hayes, of the Columbia University
Graduate School of Business, brought the crucial issue to the fore-
do takeover bids serve the public welfare? According to Hayes:
Our study shows that the typical company that has been the sub-ject of a takeover bid has been relatively unprofitable in the past
and excessively liquid. . . . Thus, the takeover bid can serve a
useful purpose when it either goads [their] sluggish managements
into more productive activity or permits a new management to
try its hand at making better use of the assets. 28
Arthur Fletcher, Jr., and Professors Stanley A. Kaplan and
Robert Mundheim concurred in this assessment, and offered refer-
ence to generalized viewpoints and implications for future situa-
tions. This triumvirate felt that a statement of plans in advance
could stifle potential tender offers, a fact not in the public interest
since the threat of tender offers had kept corporate management
competitive and efficient by not allowing it to become too secure.
In addition, Professor Kaplan took particular issue with section
26 Statement of Senator Thomas Kuchel, id. at 45-46. See Swanson, S. 510
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George
from the Dragon, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 431, 449 (1968).
27 Statement of Professor Painter, supra note 5, at 144.
28 Statement of Professor Hayes, id. at 62. See also Hayes and Taussig,
Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids-For Bidders, Incumbent Management,
and Shareholders, id. at 222.
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3 (d) (1) (7) of the Act which allows the offeree the maximum price
offered whenever he deposits. Kaplan asserted that this provision
warranted further study, indicating his predilection for the tradi-
tional role of bargaining considered appropriate in a free market.29
At the outset, then, while it may have appeared that the drafters
of Senate 510 had their eye on where they were going, some of the
assumptions upon which the Act is based suddenly seem to be all
shifting sands. A more profound scrutiny of these challenged as-
sumptions must therefore be undertaken.
IV
The whirligig of discussion engendered during the debates and
hearings over the Williams Bill (Senate 510), has brought forth
much in the way of needed examination of those legitimate values
of the tender offer which should perhaps be preserved. Hence, out
of what Cardozo termed the "attrition of diverse minds" eventually
emerges something of an "average value" greater than its com-
ponents, which leads to what should be embodied in an Act de-
signed to protect shareholders and management. Conversely, what
should be preserved as the domain of the outside acquirer who
performs certain functions of value to the investing public at large
must be assessed.
The eminent case of List v. Fashion Park, Inc.30 offers enlighten-
ment on this point. That case involved a director's purchase of
shares from a stockholder, and raised the issue of what types of
plans relating to future action must be disclosed as material facts.
In the List case the problem concerned an insider, which renders
it particularly instructive here. For in that case, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit affirmed a finding that the adoption of
a resolution to sell the corporation by the directors was not a ma-
terial fact. Such a disclosure would not have dissuaded the share-
holder from selling his shares since no profit was assured on the
proposed sale of the corporation and in any case the possibility of
sale was too remote to have affected the conduct of a reasonable
investor. Thus, even when an insider is involved, if the informa-
tion is of a speculative nature it need not be divulged and, if di-
vulged; may even provide a basis for liability.31
29 Supra note 5, at 130-38.
30 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S.
811 (1965).31 For aspects of this problem, see Comment, The Regulation of Corporate
Tender Offers under Federal Securities Law: A New Challenge for
Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CHm. L. REV. 359, 367 (1966).
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The tender offer depends to a great extent on celerity of move-
ment and secrecy. In effect, the tender offer attempts to bypass a
proxy contest for corporate control.
In comparison to the full-fledged proxy contest, the costs inci-
dental to a takeover bid are relatively low because under the terms
of the usual tender offer the outsiders do not have to put up the real
money unless and until the shares actually needed for control are
tendered to them, whereas the proxy contest entails the accumula-
tion of shares in the open market and an expensive solicitation
campaign without any assurance of ultimate success. 32
However, all of the advantages of the tender offer are not
weighted in favor of the acquirer. The corporation maintains a list
of stockholders indicating which of its shareholders own the large
blocks of stock a tenderor would seek out. Not only can personal
pressures be brought to bear, but the corporate treasury is avail-
able to incumbent management. Yet another factor in management's
control is the line of attack suggested by Schmults and Kelly of
placing obstacles in the path of the tenderor of such magnitude
that he will not be able to obtain voting control, rendering the
company less than attractive to him or weakening his ability to
carry out the offer.33
Basically, Schmults and Kelly outline devices such as raising
the annual dividend, announcing a stock split to increase the number
of shares, communicating with stockholders as to the adequacy of
the price offered, and purchasing the corporation's shares on the
market at or near the tender price. Proposal of a new issuance under
Rule 135 of the Securities Act of 1933, with first right to purchase
to present shareholders, making overtures to acquire a third com-
pany which would create anti-trust problems for the acquirer, and
making an equally attractive counter-offer are also suggested.34
32 Schmults & Kelly, Cash Takeover Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW
115 (1967).
33 Id. at 117. For an interesting example of behind-the-scenes pressure,
note the case of Glen Alden Corp. which sought control of McKesson
and Robbins, Inc. There, it was said that the chairman of McKesson
used his persuasive powers on the chairman of Chase Manhattan
Bank to abandon its plans to finance the Glen Alden purchase during
a golf game. When Chase Manhattan withdrew, Glen Alden could not
persuade other banks, by this time skeptical, to finance the purchase.
The upshot of this was that Glen Alden sold its one million McKesson
shares of Foremost Dairies, Inc., which the McKesson management had
approved. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 11, 1966, at 1, col. 6. Quoted in
Swanson, supra note 25, at 448 n. 62.
34 Schmults & Kelly, supra note 31, at 117. See case cited notes 12 & 13
and accompanying text supra. See also Krasek, Tender Offers: The
Target Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAw 455 (1969).
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This vast array of defensive tactics is used to counteract what
has probably been the primary reason for the attempt to take over
the corporation-inept management. Milton H. Cohen stresses this
fact when he states: "A second paradox is that the typical T, the
sought-after company in the tender offer, is not a glamour girl
but the reverse, a wall-flower."35 The end result of the tender offer
has been aptly pointed out by at least one author of the growing
body of literature in the area:
The takeover bid, then, is part of the larger merger and acquisi-
tion phenomenon and was developed to combat managements
opposition to a merger or acquisition proposal.... [I]t is probably
the only effective alternative available when the management of
the company being sought refuses to cooperate. The other possi-
bility is to wage a proxy contest, but this is expensive and the
chances for success are generally slim.86
Thus, while not even a majority of tender offers are successful,
since acceptance of the offer may be based on receiving the con-
trolling number of shares, the costs of a tender offer are far from
being as great as those of a proxy battle.
With this view of the use and purpose of the takeover bid in
mind, whether the 1968 amendments were wise, in a general sense,
appears to be undisputed. It is indeed true that various authors,
at the time Senate 510 was being considered by Congress, attacked
the premises of the proposed legislation. Their arguments deserve
rehearsal at this point. Professor Brudney, writing on the then
proposed Williams Bill, observed:
[I]f inequalities in lawful access to information about the issuer
of securities and their resultant values are to be ironed out, nothing
in the origins or premises of the securities legislation suggests a
purpose to eliminate all other inequalities of bargaining power-
such as those stemming from disparities in intelligence, boldness,
temperament, diligence, research, wealth, resources or other factors.
In theory, at least, such inequalities are integral to a free market
economy.3 7
Brudney further challenges the analogy of disclosure to the
offeree of a cash bid in a tender situation to that of the offeree of
a bid to exchange stock in the company for that of the offeror:
[T]he analogy is wholly inapposite .... The inescapable fact is
that the offeree of a cash bid is solicited to be a seler, not a
buyer, that the bidder is asking the offeree to disinvest, not to
invest, and is offering to pay cash, not soliciting the investor to
pay him cash or property. As sellers, the offerees, of course, have
no concern with the identity or background of the buyer . . . or
with their plans for the company.38
35 Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAvER 611 (1968).
36 Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAwYER 1091, 1094 (1968).
37 Brudney, supra note 6, at 615.
38 Id. at 616-17.
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Similarly, an extensive commentary on what was Senate 510,
appearing in the Harvard Journal of Legislation, stresses that dis-
closure to the shareholder is not necessary:
This philosophy cannot be applied to the tender offer situation.
If a shareholder decides to tender, and eventually sell, his shares, he
in effect is saying that he has no interest in the future of the cor-
poration and would rather realize his investment or put his money
to work in other corporations.39
On strict logical construction and analysis, the critics point
out a valid argument. However, their arguments state too much.
If one views what the tender offer is designed to replace, the proxy
battle, the general disclosure features of the new law are entirely
consistent with present law and, indeed, fill a noticeable void.
Under section fourteen of the Securities Act of 1934, where a con-
test for control of management of a corporation is involved the
rules require disclosure of names and interests of all participants
in the proxy contest. Furthermore, the SEC rules require that
proposed proxy material be filed in advance for examination by the
Commission for compliance with disclosure requirements.
In this light, the present extension of disclosure duties is no
clear break with the past. Rather, periodic instances such as the
burgeoning of the Rule 10b-5 cases suggested that the old order
was on its way out and a new order on its way in.
What the present author objects to, then, in the recent amend-
ment of section thirteen, is section 2 (d) (1) (C), which requires
disclosure of future plans for the corporation, such as sale, merger
alteration of the business structure, and like matter. It may be
recalled that in the discussion of the Fashion Park case at an earlier
point in this article the insider was held to have no duty to disclose
future plans, since they were regarded as too remote to affect a
reasonable investor.40 If the insider has no such duty, it may logi-
cally be asked why such a duty should be thrust upon the outsider.41
Not even in the prospectus, when a new company is offering an
issuance to the public, is disclosure of future plans permitted,
because they are regarded as of a speculative nature.
39 Swanson, supra note 25, at 471 (footnote omitted).
40 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
41 Professor Manne also notes this problem with § 2(d) (1) (C). He
further states: "It is almost inconceivable that public disclosure for
future plans of operation or liquidation would not be of very keen
interest to competitors. Nor is it satisfactory for the SEC to offer to
keep matters confidential. This would surely put the SEC in the busi-
ness of approving or disapproving changes in the plan previously
disclosed. But whether the plan is disclosed or confidential, how many
potential managers want to be strictly held to follow a specific pro-
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Milton Cohen assumes a half-way stance on this provision.4 2 He
observes that such disclosures may be essential if restricted to
further steps in fulfillment of the takeover. Beyond this, with respect
to the bidding corporation's plans to make any other major change
in the sought-after company's business or corporate structure, prob-
lems and dilemmas abound. By way of exemplification, he cites
the case of A, a total outsider, who sees a possible, or even certain,
profitable transaction flowing from the use of business, assets or
capital structure of T in a certain way. The query is put: should A
have a duty to advise potential sellers of T's stock or T's existing
management so that, presumably, they could usurp the idea or raise
the selling price? Cohen answers: "I should think not, or at least
not unless rights or obligations are elevated at many other points
in the market place."43
Of course, the problem inherent in Cohen's half-way stand is
where the line of demarcation should be drawn. Other commenta-
tors have observed problems with formulating any reasonable dis-
closure, since plans are so indefinite.44 Another writer in the area
adds dimension to this argument by noting that when an outsider
makes an evaluation as to future plans of the company he seeks
to acquire, he does so as an outsider, with the same information
available to shareholders, and indeed the financial community at
large. A decision about future plans to merge, sell or liquidate is,
then, an investment decision. The author notes that SEC rules and
policy do not require disclosure of investment analysis, the facts
used being generally available to the public.4 5
V
In general, the provisions of Public Law 90-439 appear to be
soundly constructed. The new amendments force reasonable dis-
closures in the tender offer area, a device used in essence to avoid
the proxy regulations of section fourteen of the 1934 Act. In this
gram of operation? Outside potential managers are in an especially
bad position to formulate policy of this sort, and they should not be
required to do so. This may indeed be the single most damaging pro-
vision of the entire bill, and yet without it, the thrust of the SEC's
major concern over cash tender offers seems lost." Manne, supra note 2,
at 250-51.
42 Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAw 611 (1968).
43 Id. at 615.
44 See Brudney, supra note 6, at 621-22. Brudney's major objection
centers around his argument that the offeree as seller has no vital
interest in such information. It may be recalled that the present
author rejected this line of reasoning as extending too far. It would
in effect negate any disclosure requirements under the new law.
45 Swanson, supra note 25, at 496-97.
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sense, the amendments are wholly beneficial. However, as has been
pointed out, section 2(d)(1)(C) extends the disclosure obligations to
the point of attenuation- 6
This extension is ill-advised on at least three separate grounds:
(1) it extends the disclosure obligations of the outsider beyond
those required of the insider-fiduciary; (2) it imposes a penalty
on prudent business judgment; and (3) it favors the interests of
a management which in many cases has induced the tender offer
by its ineptitude. These defects are dispositive of the question of
whether there is a need to alter the new amendments.
The section goes far to prove Lon Fuller's dictum that no law is
either possible or impossible, only wise or unwise, just or unjust.
In this case, section 2(d)(1)(C) is unwise in the extreme. It may be
hoped that the doctrine of desuetude will vitiate the consequences
of the section. However, to prevent the ghost of this section from
stalking about and casting its ominous shadow at unforeseen times,
the section should eventually be repealed.
In place of the present section, a new section should be added,
the essence of which would adopt Bromberg's distinction,47 based
upon the reasonable certitude of occurrence of the plans for the
acquired corporation. Hence, if the plans are merely speculative
and the values uncertain, no disclosure should be demanded.
46 Evidence of the fact that that section is already posing problems for
the courts, in terms of the specificity of the information to be included
in the Schedule 13D form, may be gleaned from two recent cases:
Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th
Cir. 1970) and Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.,
409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). In the International Controls case, Judge
Friendly noted with regard to the section under scrutiny that: "It
would be as serious an infringement of these regulations to overstate
the definiteness of the plans as to understate them." 409 F.2d at 948.
In the Susquehanna decision, Judge Ainsworth observed: "Though
the offeror has an obligation fairly to disclose its plans in the event
of a takeover, it is not required to make predictions of future behav-
ior, however tentatively phrased, which may cause the offeree or the
public investor to rely on them unjustifiably. . . .Target companies
must not be provided the opportunity to use the future plans provision
as a tool for dilatory litigation....
"Here the target corporation assails alleged false and misleading
omissions and statements of the offeror. The next case may well be
one in which exaggeration and overstatement is the basis of the attack.
We do not approve either understatement or extravagance. A sensible
middle course is the proper one." 423 F.2d at 1085-86 (citations
omitted).
47 BROMBERG, supra note 6.
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APPENDIX
AN ACT
JuLY 29, 1968 [S. 510] Providing for full disclosure of corporate
equity ownership of securities under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled. That section 12 (i)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is amended by striking out
"sections 12, 13, 14 (a), 14(c), and 16" and inserting in lieu thereof
"sections 12, 13, 14 (a), 14 (c), 14 (d), 14 (f), and 161.
SEc. 2. Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsec-
tions:
"(d) (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly
the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a class which
is registered pursuant to section 12 of this title or any equity se-
curity issued by a closed-end investment company registered under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of such class shall,
within ten days after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the
security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified
mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file
with the Commission, a statement containing such of the following
information, and such additional information, as the Commission
may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors-
"(A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or
on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
"(B) the source and amount of the funds or other considera-
tion used or to be used in making the purchases, and if any part
of the purchase price or proposed purchase price is represented
or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed
or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
trading such security, a description of the transaction and the
names of the parties thereto, except that where a source of funds
is a loan made in the ordinary course of business by a bank, as
defined in section 3 (a) (6) of this title, if the person filing such
statement so requests, the name of the bank shall not be made
available to the public;
"(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases
is to acquire control of the business of the issuer of the securities,
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any plans or proposals which such persons may have to liquidate
such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with any other per-
sons, or to make any other major change in its business or cor-
porate structure;
"(D) the number of shares of such security which are benefi-
cially owned, and the number of shares concerning which there
is a right to acquire, directly or indirectly, by (i) such person,
and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving the name and
address of each such associate; and
"(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or under-
standings with any person with respect to any securities of the
issuer, including but not limited to transfer of any of the securi-
ties, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts or calls,
guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of
profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding
of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, ar-
rangements, or understandings have been entered into, and giv-
ing the details thereof.
"(2) If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the
statements to the issuer and the exchange, and in the statement filed
with the Commission, an amendment shall be transmitted to the
issuer and the exchange and shall be filed with the Commission, in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
"(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or
group shall be deemed a 'person' for the purposes of this subsection.
"(4) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any per-
centage of a class of any security, such class shall be deemed to
consist of the amount of the outstanding securities of such class,
exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for the account
of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer.
"(5) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to-
"(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made or
proposed to be made by means of a registration statement under
the Securities Act of 1933;
"(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security
which, together with all other acquisitions by the same person
of securities of the same class during the preceding twelve
months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that class;
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"(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer of
such security;
"(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security
which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by order,
shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection as not
entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of,
changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as
not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection.
" (e) (1) It shall be unlawful for an issuer which has a class of
equity securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or
which is a closed end investment company registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, to purchase any equity security
issued by it if such purchase is in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission, in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors, may adopt (A) to define acts and practices
which are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative, and (B) to pre-
scribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices.
Such rules and regulations may require such issuer to provide hold-
ers of equity securities of such class with such information relating
to the reasons for such purchase, the source of funds, the number of
shares to be purchased, the price to be paid for such securities, the
method of purchase, and such additional information, as the Com-
mission deems necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors, or which the Commission deems to be
material to a determination whether such security should be sold.
" (2) For the purpose of this subsection, a purchase by or for the
issuer or any person controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with the issuer, or a purchase subject to control of the issuer
or any such person, shall be deemed to be a purchase by the issuer."
SEC. 3. Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sub-
sections:
" (d) (1) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities ex-
change or otherwise, to make a tender offer for, or a request or
invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security which is
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title, or any equity security
issued by a closed end investment company registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, if, after consummation thereof,
such person would, directly or indirectly, be the beneficial owner
of more than 10 per centum of such class, unless at the time copies
of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or
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given to security holders such person has filed with the Commis-
sion a statement containing such of the information specified in
section 13(d) of this title, and such additional informations as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of invest-
ors. All requests or invitations for tenders or advertisements mak-
ing a tender offer or requesting or inviting tenders of such a security
shall be filed as a part of such statement and shall contain such of
the information contained in such statement as the Commission may
by rules and regulations prescribe. Copies of any additional ma-
terial soliciting or requesting such tender offers subsequent to the
initial solicitation or request shall contain such information as the
Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of invest-
ors, and shall be filed with the Commission not later than the
time copies of such material are first published or sent or given to
security holders. Copies of all statements, in the form in which such
material is furnished to security holders and the Commission, shall
be sent to the issuer not later than the date such material is first
published or sent or given to any security holders.
"(2) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited
partnership, syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring,
holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or
group shall be deemed a 'person' for purposes of this subsection.
"(3) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any per-
centage of a class of any security, such class shall be deemed to
consist of the amount of the outstanding securities of such class,
exclusive of any securities of such class held by or for the account
of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer.
"(4) Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of such
a security to accept or reject a tender offer or request or invitation
for tenders shall be made in accordance with such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
"(5) Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request
or invitation for tenders may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the
depositor at any time until the expiration of seven days after the
time definitive copies of the offer or request or invitation are first
published or sent or given to security holders, and at any time after
sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or
invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by
rules, regulations, or order as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
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"(6) Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invi-
tation for tenders, for less than all the outstanding equity securities
of a class, and where a greater number of securities is deposited
pursuant thereto within ten days after copies of the offer or request
or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders
than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay for, the
securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro rata,
disregarding fractions, according to the number of securities depo-
sited by each depositor. The provisions of this subsection shall also
apply to securities deposited within ten days after notice of an
increase in the consideration offered to security holders, as described
in paragraph (7), is first published or sent or given to security
holders.
"(7) Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders before the expiration thereof by
increasing the consideration offered to holders of such securities,
such person shall pay the increased consideration to each security
holder where securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders whether or not such
securities have been taken up by such person before the variation of
the tender offer or request or invitation.
"(8) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any
offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of, any security-
"(A) proposed to be made by means of a registration state-
ment under the Securities Act of 1933;
"(B) if the acquisition of such security, together with all
other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same
class during the preceding twelve months, would not exceed 2
per centum of that class;
"(C) by the issuer of such security; or
"(D) which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by
order, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection as not
entered into for the purpose of, and not having the effect of,
changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as
not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection.
"(e) It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage
in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in
connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor
of any such offer, request, or invitation.
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"(f) If, pursuant to any arrangement or understanding with the
person or persons acquiring securities in a transaction subject to
subsection (d) of this section or subsection (d) of section 13 of this
title, any persons are to be elected or designated as directors of the
issuer, otherwise than at a meeting of security holders, and the per-
sons so elected or designated will constitute a majority of the di-
rectors of the issuer, then, prior to the time any such person takes
office as a director, and in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Commission, the issuer shall file with the Com-
mission, and transmit to all holders of record of securities of the
issuer who would be entitled to vote at a meeting for election of
directors, information substantially equivalent to the information
which would be required by subsection (a) or (c) of this section
to be transmitted if such person or persons were nominees for elec-
tion as directors at a meeting of such security holders."
Approved July 29, 1968.
